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NBC News reported, “Pakistan may be one of the world’s three remaining polio-stricken countries but Sartaj Khan has decided that the government-sponsored vaccination campaign is much more sinister than it appears. “These vaccines are meant to destroy our nation,” said Khan, a 42-year-old lawyer in the city of Peshawar. “The [polio] drops make men less manly, and make women more excited and less bashful. Our enemies want to wipe us out.” The belief has turned deadly: Nine anti-polio workers have been killed by gunmen on motorcycles this week. Some of those killed were teenage girls.” (I postpone until some future post my thoughts on why making women less bashful would be tantamount to destroying their nation. I also postpone any concern that the United States is a victim of the same plot; God knows our own men are less manly than they used to be and our women less bashful.) I’ll be curious to see if Pakistan arrests these murderers.

The separation of church and state is a foundational idea for the American way of life, enshrined in the First Amendment along with freedom of speech. As fundamentalists of all religions recognize, for example in Egypt, it is a doctrine that really says that one’s religious beliefs are at best suspect and at worst incorrect. If the beliefs of any religion were definitely true, then the first and only obligation of government would be to ensure that citizens followed those rules. So right-wing historians can talk until they’re red in the face about the Founding Fathers being Christians, but if they were, they were the sort of Christians who simply aren’t sure, or else they would have imposed a religious state. The Declaration of Independence mentions a Creator, but unlike the monarchies of Europe, which claimed to derive authority from God, our founding document says that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” That is not a religion-inspired idea. Our Founding Fathers were revolutionaries, not authorities.

Many religions, especially in their infancy and adolescence, like most dictatorships, forbid any speech—or thought—that questions authority. Criminalizing blasphemy and heresy makes sense if one is absolutely certain that the religious creed is correct. If you believe that slurring the Holy Spirit is a sure path to hell, you owe it to your children and to your community and even to heretics to crucify anyone who does this. It makes an example of heretics and offers them absolution. Theocracy and totalitarianism have so much in common that, as our Founding Fathers knew, any theocracy is bound to become a dictatorship, and any dictatorship is bound to become a theocracy. Even atheist Russia fetishized Lenin’s remains, and Nazi iconography is indistinguishable from religious iconography—think swastikas atop Christmas trees. You can identify this sort of iconography by examining what happens to people who desecrate the symbols of authority.

Certainty has been called faith, but it is better referred to as rage, because its linkage to suppression, torture, and killing over the centuries is not accidental. On a very small scale, I have been complaining about the totalitarian instincts in diversity discussions. Look to Pakistan, or any theocracy, to see what happens when certainty rears its ugly head and contrary speech is not tolerated.

The diversity agenda laudably tries to protect scientific truth from idiosyncratic perspectives and political rights from prejudice. When it tries to protect people’s feelings, it’s just wrong. Only offensive speech needs protection, and all offensive speech deserves protection (from political, not social, reprisals). If you don’t like it, say something in reply. If it comes from inside you, say something welcoming and curious. Never shut yourself up unless you are certain that the image of yourself you are trying to portray is divine. If you work for the government, take the opportunity to remind people that freedom of speech is what separates us from dictatorships. Only shut people up if you are certain that your view of what is acceptable is divinely inspired, but then prepare to go to war against people who disagree with you.

Your faith may comfort you, but it’s your doubt that comforts me.

Multiculturalism attempts to unite people by recognizing their similarities and honoring rather than denigrating their differences. (Not all differences should be honored, but that’s a different subject.) The paradox of multiculturalism is that many of the ways with which we think about differences create presently meaningful but ultimately useless ways of sorting people. Race, for example, is a powerful factor in social interaction, but has questionable roots as a legitimate classification. Categorizing people cannot be the solution to problems created by categorizing people.

Religion is a special case, because religious categorizations are often fraught intrinsically with denigration. Whether it is Jews referring to gentiles as dogs, Christians referring to Jews as murderers of God and drinkers of blood, or Muslims referring to infidels as beasts, the essential problem is not just tribal hatred, but the fact that religion is the way to heaven and an aspect of that way, at least for Christianity and Islam, is to despise nonbelievers. (If you don’t think that telling nonbelievers that they will spend eternity being tortured is an act of despising them, then I’m not sure you know what despise means.)

Religion is different from race because if you are from a white, racist family and you make friends with a black person, your family may call you names and you may suffer a revaluation of values (in Nietzsche’s phrasing) and strangers might kill you, but if you are religious and you make friends with a nonbeliever, you will lose your relationship with God and your family might kill you (depending on the religion). If a white daughter marries a black man, a racist parent may be upset and angry, but if she marries an infidel, she has risked her immortal soul and subjected it to everlasting torture, so her parents owe it to her, as Sam Harris points out, to purify her soul and kill her, to ensure her entry into paradise.

Jesus (quoting Leviticus) said to love thy neighbor, but he meant other Jews (and later was made by Paul to mean other Christians). Those who didn’t love Jesus could rot in hell. To the extent that categorizing people is the problem—we reserve complete humanity for those in the right categories and treat everyone else differently—religion is the ultimate categorizer. This is true because categories largely depend on words rather than on evidence. Verbal categories get us to see the world in terms of those categories, which is why race is still a powerful factor even though it doesn’t exist in nature. Nothing elevates words like religion. Only religion would put something written thousands of years ago ahead of contemporary evidence.

I recognize that not all religious people think nonbelievers are going to be tortured for eternity, or that they should be treated badly while on earth. That’s because they are only semi-religious—they believe only some aspects of the written word, not all of it. It’s not a defense of religion to say that it often doesn’t fully take hold. Their faith may comfort the faithful, but it’s their doubt that comforts anyone who has to interact with the faithful.

It takes a lot of mind-bending to look at a cross and not see Roman torture or the Inquisition or the Crusades or contemporary stupidities about geology and the reason for hurricanes and earthquakes, or to look at Muslim iconography and not see suicide bombers and honor killings and jihad. Only in religion will people hold on to iconography despite such desecrations. Oh yeah, and patriotism too. Both raise the question of whether you are going to believe what you are told or whether you are going to be a critical thinker. As someone once said, are you going to love God and Country the way four-year-old children love their parents or the way adults do? It’s characteristic of four-year-old children not only to revere their parents but also to despise anyone who doesn’t.

Nietzsche called himself an antichrist because he tried to restore some values that Christians had discarded. Nietzsche believed that it was once good to be strong and bad to be weak, but in an effort to make the weak feel better about themselves, Jesus had taught them that it was good to be weak and evil to be strong. Much the same thinking pervades the diversity discourse. You’re not supposed to say one worldview is superior to another, regardless of what you mean by superior. You’re not supposed to say that one person exceeds another on any dimension that has a positive connotation. It’s okay to say that one person is more extraverted than another if you are careful to specify that there’s nothing wrong with introversion. You can say that one person is smarter than another if you add words to the effect that intelligence is some sort of parlor trick, and of course less intelligent people are just as worthy as smart people.

But worthy of what? The Nazis undertook to murder people who were not sufficiently intelligent, so if you suggest that intelligence ought to be a factor in college admissions, you will likely be compared to Nazis. The Nazis thought that mentally retarded individuals were not worthy to live. And, yes, that is still the technical term for them, even if professional multiculturalists insist on “people with mental retardation” to emphasize what doesn’t need emphasizing—that they are people. But it’s possible to think that mentally retarded persons, or even people in the lower half of intelligence, are not worthy to sit on the Supreme Court or not worthy to have their ideas about physics carefully considered without thinking they are not worthy to have their civil rights protected.

And yes, I recognize that “intelligence” is bandied about as a substitute for other traits, and I recognize that it is not always easy to measure intelligence (though nowhere near as hard as you might think) and I loved Stephen Jay Gould’s book, The Mismeasure of Man, about abuses in intelligence testing. But come on, the fact that it is not always easy to tell how smart someone is doesn’t mean that it’s evil to consider the question. Everyone can see plainly that when Will Hunting solves the math problem, it’s a function of his being smarter than most janitors. My mom’s humorous definition of intelligence was “the extent to which other people agree with me,” which captured the problem that Gould wrote about. My definition of intelligence is “how well your brain works.” It isn’t easy to tell how well someone’s brain works, but it’s a concept not substantially different from understanding how well an arm or an immune system works.

“Mentally retarded” has become an offensive term, as have the equally neutral, equally scientific terms that preceded it. These include imbecile, idiot, and moron. “Retarded,” a fancy word for slow, will soon be replaced with “intellectual disability,” and two years from then, you will hear one school kid call another an “I.D.” And then you will refer, in a perfectly professional manner, to someone as a person with I.D., and someone will wag her finger at you and tell you that there’s nothing wrong with being different.

But there is something wrong with being mentally retarded, or well below average in intelligence in a college, or barely average in a graduate school or a profession. The reason the names for being in the bottom 2% (which is the definition of mental retardation) keep turning into insults is that the condition referred to is itself undesirable. That’s what’s meant by the word, disability, which is already in danger of being substituted with “differently abled.”

Some liberals must despise disabled people to go to such lengths to disguise their real impairments with vague language, as if the disability is too horrid to contemplate. Sorry. I should have said, “people with liberal ideas.”

There seem to be three kinds of women in my life, sorted by their reactions when I am smart or funny or gleeful. The first kind appreciates my happy, intellectual, aggressive brand of play, and some of the members of this group even play along, smacking my serves back over the net as it were, putting their own spin on my ideas, making jokes of their own, surprising and being surprised. I am married to one of those. But in this group, even the ones who merely appreciate me, laughing at my jokes and getting my ideas, foster more jokes and more ideas. There are a lot of lesbians in this group, partly because lesbians have, at a much higher rate than straight women, liberated themselves from fairy tale fantasies of daintiness, and are not psychologically allergic to exuberance. Also, of course, lesbians as a rule don’t hate men or male energy—why would they?

The second group of women is afraid of me. Once, when my younger son was three years old, I asked him, “If you were an animal, what kind of animal would you be?” He said, “I thought we were dragons.” Impassioned speech, unexpected ideas, inappropriate humor—these strike this group of women as interesting, but only from a distance, like fire. They don’t actively avoid me, but neither do they approach me. They’re surprised if I act kindly, but they’re not really irritated by it, because they haven’t built an explanatory architecture around what they make of me or of themselves. When I run into one of them, I see they are watchful and ready to jump out of their skins. I avoid them, not because interacting with them is unpleasant, but because I find them boring unless I am authorized to comment on what is going on between us.

The third group resents me. I mean to use Nietzsche’s term for how the weak feel about the strong, how the unhappy feel about the happy, how the dull feel about those who shine. I doubt they would read a blog I wrote, but if they did, they would bristle at my referring to myself as strong and at my referring to any woman as weak. Generally, they express their resentment by snubbing me, but some of them will directly tell me that I am unaware of my male privilege or my white privilege, as if they think that it is only my maleness and whiteness that makes me funny or clever or lively. (I am not seeking credit, by the way, for my vitality; like feeling grateful rather than guilty for having privileges, I feel lucky to be someone who has good ideas and says funny things.) These are the women who think that if a woman says something smart in a group, it’s proof that women are as smart as men, rather than enjoying what she said, and if a man says something smart in a group, they think it’s proof that he is marginalizing others by taking up air time, rather than enjoying what he said. The only thing they tend to enjoy is a man’s (or an assertive woman’s) comeuppance.

For most of my life, I spent a lot of energy trying to get resentful women to like me. Seven years ago, I promised myself to stop doing that, and I have been much happier since then. If you are yourself a person prone to happiness, cleverness, or humor, you might also want to focus on finding playmates and not on pleasing the frightened or resentful people you are bound to meet.

“Radical feminism argues that the source of women’s oppression is a patriarchal society. [Patriarchy’s] fundamental premise is the oppression of women [and its] positions of power and authority … are generally reserved exclusively for men.”

You wouldn’t believe the crap I have to read just to make it through my week. I know, I know—women have had to read demoralizing crap for centuries. As if that helps. No, I don’t see how it helps anyone except the professional haters to view the world as men versus women.

And just to be clear: I have nothing against women. Some of my best friends are women. I was raised by a woman. I dated a woman in college.

My point is that many people gain political power and money by drumming up fear and anger, and the best way to drum up fear and anger is to refer to categories of people as if they are all the same. On top of the effort to paint life as a war between men and women, the quotation raises questions about what can possibly be meant by “generally reserved exclusively.” If power is reserved generally for men, that means some women have power; if power is reserved exclusively for men, that means no women have power. And that’s the problem: the conflation of the general and the particular.

There’s a simple cure. Just insert the word, some, into propositions about people. This produces, with the example above, “the source of some women’s oppression is a patriarchal society,” which is still debatable but at least not intrinsically offensive.

Another problem with construing the society as a battle between men and women is that it ignores the fact that the vast majority of men were raised by women. Supposedly, women are made (by men) to hate themselves and to perpetuate sexism, but that’s a perspective that itself defines women as impotent. Conflicts between societies, religions, and tribes can sensibly be viewed either as co-constructed or as a clash of agendas, depending on whether you think, say, the Israelis and the Palestinians are in a system together or in a clash of systems. But surely within a tribe, conflicts between the sexes can only be construed as systemic, as co-constructed. It’s as hard to be a decent man in a patriarchal society as it is to be a decent women (the recent movie, A Separation, set in Iran, is about that very difficulty).

So insist on “some.” When they tell you white people are privileged, ask them to say some white people, on some occasions. When they tell you black people voted overwhelmingly for Obama because he wants to give them stuff, ask them to say some black people. Once the exceptions are noted, they’ll be forced to attach a specific percentage to their generalizations, and their utter lack of data will become clear.

A recent headline claimed that “Whites Believe They Are Victims of Racism More Often Than Blacks” at http://now.tufts.edu/news-releases/whites-believe-they-are-victims-racism-more-o). I didn’t bother to read the study itself since so many published studies are simply wrong, but the article states that the study authors “asked a nation-wide sample of 208 blacks and 209 whites to indicate the extent to which they felt blacks and whites were the targets of discrimination in each decade from the 1950s to the 2000s. A scale of 1 to 10 was used, with 1 being ‘not at all’ and 10 being ‘very much.’”

Well, just look at the methodology, and you can see why the evaluation of racism in the 2000s, after first priming subjects to think of racism in the 1950s, will seem better for blacks and worse for whites. So the study doesn’t tell us what people really think. What interests me, though, are other ways that context can affect our thinking about racism.

If you are white and expect that you will not be put into your skin in a way that makes you self-conscious, because it rarely happens to you, then any instance of it happening to you will stand out, and you may overestimate the degree of racism in your life. Also, when the news of the day is that colleges discriminate against white applicants and the 1965 Voting Rights Act is unconstitutionally forceful in protecting the rights of black voters (these are upcoming Supreme Court cases), then the availability heuristic—we overemphasize whatever comes to mind—is likely to make you think that there is a lot of anti-white racism.

If you are black and have been forewarned by your family about the ubiquity of racism in America, then you are likely to be struck by the many instances of not encountering it, and you are likely to underestimate the anti-black racism in America. Also, even though your friends tell each other stories of racism, many mainstream news and entertainment outlets don’t. (“’Man bites dog’ is news.”)

My own view is that whites and blacks in America have about the same number of racist moments, but that the cost for blacks is much greater. Most people self-select for situations where they are not constantly put in their skin, either by looking for (or staying stuck in) social networks and neighborhoods and jobs where they are not stigmatized, or by making places more comfortable with them just by being there and behaving well. So most people lead lives that do not produce racist encounters. But the places that blacks have to avoid to avoid racism are more potentially valuable to them than are the places to whites that whites avoid to avoid racism. This is partly because white-oriented places are richer and are paths to wealth, but it is also because there are just a lot more white-oriented places in America than black-oriented or neutral places. In that sentence, I mean by “white-oriented” a place where you don’t stand out if you’re white, but you do stand out if you’re black. The odds of finding the best college, job, friends, romantic partner, or entertainment for yourself are greater if there are more places you can look.

In a completely racist marital market, for example, with 10% blacks and 90% whites (I’m oversimplifying) in a city of 200,000 people, a young black woman might find that of the 10,000 black men in the city, a thousand of them are in her age bracket and 500 of them are single. A young white woman is looking at 4500 prospects. The white woman is 9 times more likely than the black woman to find a man who matches her desired profile of traits. If they’re lesbians, they’re even worse off. If race is not a barrier, both straight women are looking at 5000 prospects. In this example, the straight black woman still gets married but only because the black man she marries also has to settle. My point is that just by being the majority, financial opportunities aside, anti-black racism is more costly than anti-white racism when cost involves happiness.